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IN'IRODUCTION

International tensions presently facing the United States
threaten to make the 1980's one of the most significant decades in the
history of the United States. Examples of the tensions that endanger
American interests in the international arena are plentiful.

Differences

with our European allies and unrest in El Salvador are prime illustrations
of these tensions.
The Middle 'East, which has always been of great interest to the
United States,

will be the area of greatest consequence, while also being

the most difficult problem for the United States to deal with.

The Middle

East's imJ)Ortance as a region stems from these facts 1
(1 ) America's need for Middle Eastern oil will continue and
( 2 ) The Middle East is strategically important because it
is the crossroads to three continents. This strategic consideration
becomes even more crucial when recent moves into the area by the
Soviet Union are taken into account.
The basic premise of this paper is that American diplomacy in
the Middle East always has been and will continue to be a dilemma for
the United States.

The creation of the State of Israel intensified

this dilemma.
The problem facing the United States is that its interests in
the Middle East are best served by a resolution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict which has plagued the area for over thirty years.
1

The dilemma

2

becomes apparent when it is realized that no resolution to the ArabIsraeli dispute can be reached until a successful solution to the
Palestinian Problem has been achieved.

Even a partial settlement to

this problem cannot be reached until all the varied factions involved
agree to sit down at the same table and talk.
Realizing this, American policymakers should direct their
efforts in the Middle East toward finding a solution to the Palestinian
Problem.

'nle search for this solution is the main focus of this study.
This search for the possible solutions to the Palestinian

Problem will begin with a short history of the problem that ranges from
just prior to the first Arab-Israeli War to shortly before the onset of
President Carter's term in office in 1977.
The study will continue with a section that examines the parts
played by the Arab countries and Israel in the problem and how the
Palestinians themselves fit into the picture.

The next segment of the

paper looks at some of the people and groups who either claim to be or
are recognized as the representatives of the Palestinian people and at
recent United States' diplomacy concerning the Palestinian Problem.
The major emphasis of this paper will be on ths United States'
diplomacy dealing with the problem during the Carter administration and
beyond.
here.

The Camp David Peace Accords will be of special significance
The policies of the Reagan administration will also be critiqued.

This study will conclude with a section that makes some suggestions on how the United States should proceed in finding a solution to
the Palestinian Problem.

SOURCES OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBIEM

The roots of the Palestinian Problem can be compared to the
roots of a large tree,
entangled or gnarled.

Both kinds of roots are hidden and become
The roots of the Palestinian Problem have

become so entangled that there is virtually no agreement on the causes
of the problem,

One of the major obstacles to reaching a solution to

the problem is the lack of agreement as to what caused the problem.
The distance between parties to the dispute is highlighted by some of
the extreme positions taken in the argument.

One position maintains

that there really are no Palestinians or any Palestinian Problem.
The belief that there is no problem is, of course, ludicrous.
According to the people involved, the one thing they can agree on is
that some Palestinians did leave Palestine.

Aside from this one

agreement there has been no common ground between the parties until
very recently.

Each side to the argument has its own theory as to

why the Palestinian exodus took place and its own theory about which
side has legitimate rights to the land that was called Palestine.
The major parties involved in the problem are the Israelis,
the Arab states that harbor Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinians
themselves.

Palestinian participation in a resolution of the problem

has been hindered by the fact that they do not have their own state.
The question over Palestinian

re~resentation

4

has also kept the

5
Palestinians out of any direct attempts at finding a solution to their
uroblem,

Although the plight of the Palestinians intensified when

Israel won the first Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian Problem really
began in the late 1800's before there ever was a state of Israel.
Prior to 1947, the land that is now occupied by the state of
Israel was called Palestine.

Palestine was inhabited by both Arabs
and Jews, with Arabs in the majority. 1 The British ruled Palestine
under the authority of a mandate given them by the League of Nations
in April, 1920.

During February of 1947 the British government

announced it was not going to continue ruling Palestine.

This

annou.'"lcement created a vacuum that brought the dispute over Palestine
to a head.
Before the British announcement both Jews and Arabs were
making claims to Palestine.

The Jews, behind a movement called

Zionism, declared that Palestine was to become the national home for
Jews.

Zionists believed that the British gave them permission to

create a Jewish national home in Palestine.

The Zionists cited the

Balfour Declaration of 1918 as proof of their claim.
home was to become the state of Israel.

This national

The creation of the state of

Israel was the prime cause of the first Arab-Israeli War.

As a result

of this war, many Palestinians became refugees in countries such as
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.
This is where the theories of each side come into conflict.
Two books bring out the conflicting positions of the Arabs and Israelis

6
very well.

w.

The two books are:

The Question of Palestine by Edward

Said2 which presents the Palestinian View and Battleground•

Fact

and Fantasy in Palestine by Samuel Katz3 which represents the Jewish
side.
The government of Israel believes that the Palestinians fled
from Palestine in 1947 and 1948 under the orders of Arab leaders.

The

Arab leaders supposedly asked the Palestinian Arabs to leave their
homes in Palestine so invading Arab armies could better attack Israel.
Katz describes the situation this waya
The Arabs are the only declared refugees who became
refugees not by the action of their enemies or because of wellgrounded fear of their enemies, but by the initiative of their
own leaders. For nearly a generation, those leaders have willfully kept as many people as they possibly could in a degenerating
squalor, preventing their rehabilitation, and holding out to all
of them the hope of return and of "vengeance" on the Jews of
4
Israel, to whom they have transferred the blame for their plight.
The Palestinians, however, deny that they left Palestine
because Arab leaders asked them to.

Instead, they believe that they

have been the innocent victims of Zionist imperialism.

Zionism

originated in Europe during the late 1800's as a response to the longstanding discrimination of Jews.

This discrimination intensified in

the twentieth century and led to the formation of a movement for the
establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

This movement

was founded by Theodor Herzl in the 1890's and was called Zionism.5
The problem with this view of Zionism was not the creation of
a Jewish national home, but that it made no provision for the population
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already in Palestine.

Palestinians contend that the Zionists intended

to just push them off the land.

If this is true, how could the Zionists

justify this action? Said explains it this way:
As Herzl first conceived of it in the nineties, Zionism
was a movement to free Jews and solve the problem of anti-semitism
in the West; later elaborations of this idea took Palestine as the
place where the conce'!'tion was to be materially fulfilled. In
addition to being the place where there existed a spiritual bond
in the form of a covenant between God and the Jews, Palestine had
the further advantage of being a backward province in an even more
backward empire. Therefore, the effort of all Zionist apologetics
from the beginning was to lay claim to Palestine both as a backward,
largely uninhabited territory and as a place where the Jews, enjoying a unique histo;ical privilege, could reconstitute the land into
a Jewish homeland.

Said goes on to say that it was always the plan of the Zionist
movement to deny the existence o:f any Palestinian Arab population in
Palestine.

He statesa

It is more likely that there will remain the inverse
resistance which has characterized Zionism and Israel since the
beginning: the refusal to admit, and the consequential denial of,
the existence of Palestinian Arabs who are there not simply as an
inconvenient nuisance, but as a nouulation with an indissoluble
bond with the land.7
- Said is convinced that Palestine's :fate was never decided in
Palestine.

Instead, it was decided in Western capitals in Europe by

men such as Theodor Herzl and Lord Rothschild.
up

Their plan was to set

a Jewish national home in Palestine after having removed the popula-

tion already there.

A section from the Complete Diaries of Theodor

Herzl demonstrates what was to be done With this population:
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We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the
border by procuring emnloyment for it in the transit countries,
while denying it any em~loyment in our own country.
Both the process of expropriation and the remoSal of the
noor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.
The Palestinian position in short is that they were pushed out
of their homeland by Jews who were followers of a movement called
Zionism that started in 1897 and resulted in the first Arab-Israeli
War in 1948.

Although the Palestinians have been out of Palestine only

since the war in 1948, they feel that their plight really began with
the formation of Zionism.
They also feel that the Jews had little right to do this and
that the Jewish government of Israel has conducted a campaign to keep
the truth about their being forced out of Palestine by Zionism a
secret.

Said believes that ever since the formation of the state of

Israel the Jewish government there has denied the existence of a
Palestinian-Arab population in Palestine.

Said says this campaign

continues even today:
For too many people who read the press, who watch television and listen to the radio, who pretend to more than a
smattering of political knowledge, who confess to expert opinions
on international controversy, the Middle East is essentially the
Arab-Israeli conflict and little more. There is a considerable
reductiveness in this view, of course, but what is really wrong
with it is that most of the time it literally blocks Palestine
from having anything to do with the Middle East of today, which
since September, 1978 seems entirely symbolized by Menachem Begin,
Anwar al-5adat, and Jimmy Carter locked up together at Camp David,
A considerable majority of the literature on the Middle East, at
least until 1968, gives one the impression that the essence of
what goes on in the Middle East is a series of unending wars
between a group of Arab countries and Israel, That there had been
such an entity as Palestine until 1948, or that Israel's existence its "independence" as the phrase goes - was the result of the

9

eradication of Palestine: of these truths beyond dispute most
people who follow events in the Middle East are more or less
:ignorant, or unaware. But what is most important is the continuing
avoidance or ignorance of the existence today of about four million
Muslim and Christian Arabs who are known to themselves and to
others as Palestinians. They make up the question of Palestine,
and if there is no country called Palestine it is not because
there are no Palestinians.9
According to the Palestinians, the Jews made Palestine their
national homeland wrongfully and illegally.

The Jews on the other hand

say that they have a special religious right to Palestine.

Jews claim

that their rights and ties to Palestine have existed longer and are
more important than any ties the Palestinians have.

In order to justify

this, the Jews claim that before they came into the area Palestine was
nothing more than a political backwater that was lightly populated.
Zionists contend that whatever population was there was inferior to the
European Jews that would be migrating there.

This fact was supposed to

further justify the creation of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine.
Zionists also claimed that the Palestinian belief that Jews had
no right to Palestine because of the small Jewish presence there is
erroneous.

The Jews claim that they had both an emotional and physical

presence in Palestine.

Samuel Katz

g1 ves

an example of this physical

presence a
It is a continuity that waxed and waned, that moved in
kaleidoscopic shifts, in response to the pressures of the foreign
imperial rulers who in bewildering succession imposed themselves
on the country. It is a pattern of stubborn refusal in the face
of oppression, banishment and slaughter, to let go of an often
tenuous hold in the country, a determined digging in sustained by
a faith in the ultimate full restoration of which every Jew living
in the homeland saw himself as caretaker and p.recursor.10
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This physical presence has been denied by the Palestinians.
The Palestinians, however, cannot deny that Jews living in Europe
and other parts of the world were being discriminated against.

Jews

had thought of themselves as a people without a nation ever since the
Jewish defeat and Diaspora in ?0 A.D.
Zionism was a response to this discrimination.

The thought of

having a homeland in Palestine to escape to gave many Jews some hope in
what would otherwise have been a hopeless situation.

This was especially

true after Hitler came to power in Germany and all through World War II.
Here is an example of the form this hope assumed1
Never in the periods of greatest persecution did the Jews
as a people renounce that faith. ~rever in the periods of greatest
peril to their very existence physically, and the seeming impossibility of their ever regaining the land of Israel, did they seek
a substitute for the homeland. Time after time throughout the
centuries, there arose bold spirits who believed, or claimed, they
had a plan, or a divine vision, for the restoration of the Jewish
people to Palestine.11
These same Jews, in addition to having the hope of returning to
Palestine, also believed they had a better right to the land than any
other group.
illegally.

They also believed that they were removed from the land
Samuel Katz talks of how deep the feeling of a Jewish right

to the land wentt
But to the neople, the land - as it was called for all
those centuries1 simply Ha'aretz, unchanging and irreplaceable.
If ever a right has been maintained by unrelentin~ insistence on
the claim, it was the Jewish right to Palestine.1
Katz also talks about how the Jews feel their land was taken
from them and how they never stopped thinking about it:
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The Jews were never a people without a homeland. Having
been robbed of their land, Jews never ceased to give expression to
their anguish at their deprivation and to pray for and demand its
return. Throughout the nearly two millennia of dispersion,
Palestine remained the focus of the national cul tu:re. Every single
day in all those seventy ~nerations, devout Jews gave voice to
their attachment to Zion. 1 J
Samuel Katz reports that aside from believing they had a
special right to the land, Jews also believed that the Arabs there did
not take care of the land.

Jews thought that since the Arabs did not

think much of the land they did not have any right to 1t.

Katz makes

these points clear in these passages:
Palestine was never more than an unconsidered backwater of
the empire. No great political or cul tu:ral center ever arose there
to establish a source of Arab, or any other non-Jewish, affinity or
attachment.
To the Arab rulers and their non-Arab successors, Palestine
was a battleground, a corridor, sometimes an outpost, its people a
source of taxes and of some manpower for the waging of endless
foreign and internecine wars ,14
Katz finishes by saying:
The Arabs did, however, play a significant and specific
role in one aspect of Palestine's life: They contributed effectively to its devastation. Where destruction and ruin were only
partly achieved by warring imperial dynasties - by Arab, Turkish,
Persians, or Egyptians, by the Crusaders or by invading hordes of
Mongols of Kha.rezmians - it was supplemented by the revolts of
local chieftains, by civil strife, by intertribal warfare within
the population itself.15
Palestinians respond to these claims by saying they had always
lived on the land and loved it.
Palestine.

They say their existence is tied to

Jews answer by saying:
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There was never a. "Palestinian Arab" nation. To the Arab
people as a. whole, no such entity a.s Palestine eXisted. To those
of them who lived in its neighborhood, its lands were a suitable
object for plunder and destruction. They were not conscious of
any relationship to a. land and even the townsmen would have heard
of its existence a.s a. land, if,they hea.rd of it at all, only from
such Jews a.s they might meet.1o
The historical digests given above demonstrate that the
positions of Jews and Arabs are far apart,

These differences existed

even before the formation of the state of Israel and Israel's victory
in the first Arab-Israeli War.
I sra.el' s victory, however, did exacerbate the already tenuous
situation,

As a result of the war and I sra.eli victory, many Pales-

•

tinians had to leave Palestine.
countries

~~d

These people went to other Arab

became the Palestinian refugees.

These refugees have

become another factor in what wa.s an already serious problem.
In addition to the arguments over which side has a right to
the land, the refugees have created some additional arguments.

The

first argument is over whether or not the Palestinians left of their
own accord or were forced out by their own leaders.
already been discussed in earlier sections.

This problem has

The arguments, as noted

before, say that Jews claim Arab leaders told the Palestinians to
leave while Palestinians state they they left because of the occupation
of Palestine by Jews during the war.
Although some Palestinians did leave of their own accord
before the war, it is most logical to assume that the majority of
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Palestinians were forced out by the Israelis during the war.

William

Polk states his opinion:
Although extensively a small-scale affair in comparison to
European wars, the 1948-49 war was intensively one of the most
disruptive in modern times. Upwards of 80 percent - about 800,000 of the Arab population of Palestine lost their homes, l~~ds, and
cotmtry.17
Polk's account of the Palestinians leads to the second argument
between Jews and Palestinians.

This dispute concerns the number of

Palestinians that actually left Palestine.

Jews say the number is very

low, while Palestinians say that the number is quite high.

A good

example of this argument are the differences in the figures that Katz
and Polk use.

Katz believes that there were actually 5,000 or 6,000
people who left Palestine after the war. 18 Polk's figures are much
higher, he thinks there were 800,000 Palestinian refugees after the
war.19
Shortly after the war, the United Nations sent an agency into
the Middle East to tend to these Palestinian refugees.

The name of

this organization was the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
This

~~ency

set up camps for the refugees in countries such as

Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

The plight of the Palestinian refugee

was not good for, in addition to having been forced from his home,
his new home, the refugee camps, were not very good.

William Polk

tells of the condition of the refugee camps:
In the camps the refugees lived in a "deplorable material
and moral situation". The most employable, the best educated, and
the lucky found temporary or permanent homes in Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Libya, or further afield; those who remained in
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the camps lived in a limbo in which they initially gave up trying
to control their destiny. Their condition was beyond desperation desperation is, after all, an emotion of one who still actively
tries to control his fate.20
The individual refugee in each camp received about 1,600
calories from an insipid diet; which was enough to keep the refugees
going physically, but their emotional and intellectual diet was less
sustaining. 21
The problem of poor conditions in the camps was complicated by
the fact that the countries that hosted these camps did not receive the
refugees with open arms.
Palestinian refugees.

Jordan was the only country that welcomed the

Polk describes the attitude of the host countries

toward the refugees:
Dependent upon the United Nations for a monthly dole, they
depended upon the inhabitants of the "host country" for everything
else. Jobs were few and payment exploitative. Both pitied and
resented, they competed for the available jobs and were a constant
reminder of Arab weakness. Those in the camps in Lebanon needed
but hated - and were used by but annoyed - the Lebanese.22
The Palestinians were often used as a "political football" by
the countries that harbored them.

Samuel Katz believes that the govern-

ments of these countries inflated the figures on refugee rolls so that
they would receive more money from the United Nations.

He claims they

did this by using the names of refugees who had died and of those who
had returned to Israel or gone somewhere else. 23
The conditions that were just described remained the way of life
for most Palestinian refugees until the early 1970's, at which time a
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number of different groups claimed to

re~esent

their cause.

A full

discussion of these groups will be undertaken in the next section.
Finally, it can be seen that the history of the Palestinians
from before the first Arab-Israeli War until the present day has been
terribly disruptive.

Disputes dominate this history.

The questions of

why the Palestinians left Palestine and who has a better right to
Palestine, Jews or Palestinians, are just two of these disputes.
The history of the Palestinian refugees has also been turbulent.
Unwanted, and exploited by most of the countries they now reside in,
these people truly do live in a state of limbo.

Another important part

of the history is the deep feelings among Jews and Palestinians.
dispute is not just over land, it goes much deeper than that.

Their

These

incredibly deep feelings will have to be taken into account by anyone
trying to find a solution to the Palestinian Problem.
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A TENUOUS BOND

The relationship between the Palestinians and certain countries
in the Middle East will be one of the topics of this section.
relationship can be termed a tenuous bond.

This

The issue of representation

of the Palestinian people will also be examined.

Finally, recent

diplomatic action by the United States concerning these two issues will
be analyzed.
The Palestinians and the Middle East
All of the countries in the Middle East have a.11 interest in
the Palestinian Problem.

The degree of concern each country feels for

the Palestinians determines how much support the Palestinians receive
from individual Middle Eastern states.

The internal situation present

in these countries also dictates the amount of support that can be
given to the Palestinians.
Israel has the largest stake in the problem.

The countries

bordering Israel are also deeply concerned about the problem.
countries are Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Leba.11on.

These

Saudi Arabia, Irao,

and Libya also figure prominently.
Most of these countries are host countries for Palestinian
refugee camps maintained by the United
Agency.

~ations

Relief and Works

Conditions in these camps have already been described.
18

Looking

19
at only these camps, however, is not enough.

The Palestinian relation-

ship to Middle Eastern countries goes much deeper.
The first country that will be examined is I!.!Q_.

The super-

ficial aspects of Iraq's relationship with the Palestinians can be
summed up this ways
On the pan-Arab level, the most important territorial
issue for Irao is that of Palestine and the lands under Israeli
occupation since June, 196?. Iraq has persistently and uneouivocally demanded a just solution to the Palestine problem.1
Upon closer inspection, the true situation in Iraq comes to
light:
to the

the Iraqi government has not been able to give much support
P~estinian

cause.

There are two reasons for this.

First,

Iraq's internal squabbles between the Ba'ath government and Kurdish
elements took un a lot of time and resources.
Second, Iraq favors an organization that allows general Arab
membership and participation to represent the Palestinians.
stance has isolated Iraq from other Arab countries.

This

Most other Arab

countries believe that the organization that represents the Palestinians
should have Palestinian members only.
The Palestinian-Iraqi relationship reached its nadir in
September, 19?0 when Iraqi troops in Jordal'l did not help Palestinian
commandos in their battle against the Jordanian government.

Relations

on all levels between the Palestinians and the Iraqis improved after
the Iraqi government settled its differences with the Kurds.
tini~~s

Pales-

in Iraq were then granted rights, such as equal employment.
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These moves were an indication of the general softening trend in the
Iraqi government's attitude toward the Palestinians.

The Palestinian

issue once again became a secondary concern when the Iran-Iraq War
began in September, 1980. 2
Syria's support for the Palestinian cause is unquestioned.
Syria, unlike other Palestinian supporters, devotes much more time and
energy to their support.

The depth of Syria's support can be seen in

this passage 1
The Syrian government has considered itself, and generally
has been viewed, as the most consistent supporter of the Palestinian cause. There is also an indissoluble link between the
Palestinian issue and the larger Arab-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli
questions. The questions Damascus has had to face in this area
include the extent to which political support should be furnished
to the Palestinian cause; the ends for which this support should
be provided; the degree of military and logistical assistance to
be provided ••• and, directly associated with each of these
problems, the specific Palestinian groups to be supported.)
The Palestinians do not, however, receive unlimited support
from Syria.

The Syrian government keeps close tabs on Palestinian

activity by imposing many restrictions on this activity.

The Syrians

do not intend to lose control of their country to Palestinian commandos,
as Jordan did in 1970.
Syrian support for the Palestinian resistance did increase
when Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December of 1981.
Heights are a natural border between Israel and Syria.

The Golan

Prior to the

1967 war, Syria held the Golan Heights,

Israel captured and has ruled

them as occupied territory ever since,

Syria will probably escalate its

21
support of the Palestinian commandos even further in answer to the
4
annexation.
Lebanon has been a. country torn by civil war and by the presence
of a. foreign army within its borders.

The civil war began in 197.5 and

wa.s fought between Sunni and Shi' 1te Moslems and I1aroni te Christians.

A

Palestinian resistance movement against Israel further complicated this
si tua.tion.

The Palestinians joined forces with the Moslems.

Responding

to this development, Israel began supporting the Maronite Christians.
Syria. then sent its army into Lebanon, first to fight the Moslems and
then to combat the Israeli-backed Christians.
The civil war kept the Lebanese from maintaining strong control
over Palestinian actions within Lebanon.

Palestinian commandos were

launching raids against Israel from bases in southern Lebanon.

These

attacks alienated the Palestinians from Moslems living in southern
Lebanon.

'Ihe Shi 'ite villagers living there wanted to throw the

Palestinian commandos out of the area • .5
The presence of Palestinian forces in Lebanon has continually
brought hardship to the Lebanese people.
the Israelis launched

~~

During the latter part of 1978,

armored attack that drove deep into Lebanon,

all the way to the Li tani River.

The headquarters of the Palestine

Liberation Organization, in Beirut, was the target of an Israeli
bombing mission in July, 1981.

Most recently, Israel conducted air

attacks on villages in southern Lebanon,
"retaliatory warn1ng", 6

Israel termed this attack a
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Writing an article for Time Magazine, Roger Rosenblatt describes
the birth of one Lebanese child.

The child's name is Palestine.

Pales-

tine's strange birth is just one example of the pain the Lebanese endure
for the Palestinians:
For want of a standard term, the doctor on the case called
the delivery a "caesarean section by explosion". It occurred last
July in Beirut, during an Israeli air raid on the Fa.khani Street
P.L.O. offices, when Palestine's mother, nine-months p.regnant,
rushed from her apartment house in an effort to escape the bombs.
No one is certain what happened next, but when the bombing stopped,
Mrs. Halaby was found dead in the rubble. 'Ihree meters away,
still enveloped in the placenta, lay her new little girl.?
Palestinia~s,

for Lebanon.

however, were not the sole source of concern

The placement of surface-to-air missles in Lebanon's

Bekka Valley by Syria also brought the specter of war w1 th Israel to
8
Lebanon.
Confusion caused by the civil war and the other problems
Lebanon has had to face has created a love-hate relationship between
the Palestinians and the Lebanese,

The Lebanese hope the Palestinians

regain their homeland, but the constant threat of Israeli attack
has weakened the spirit of Lebanese support for the Palestinians.
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Palestinian commandos are so entrenched in southern Lebanon that Jordan's
fate of September, 1970 could be relived by Lebanon in the near future. *
Egypt's backing of the Palestinian cause since the 1948 war has
been sporadic and troubled.

Directly after the 1948 war, Egypt's

sympathy for the Palestinians was quite strong:
Since the creation of Israel in 1948 and the ensuing
expulsion-emigration of the Arab population from the area constituting the Jewish state, Egypt has consistently supported the
"inherent" right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes
and lands and to establish an independent political entity in
Palestine. Always unequivocal in defending the rights of the
Palestinians to regain their terri tory, Egypt has maintained
relations with the various Palestinian organizations that have
oscillated between cordiality and enmity.9
The 1967 war created even stronger bonds between Egypt and the
Palestinians.

Good relations, however, eroded over the issue of who

was to represent the Palestinians in negotiations.

The methods used to

*When Israel won the 1948 war, Jordan's fate became cemented
to the fate of the Palestinians. Only Israel has been influenced
more by the Palestinians than Jordan. Many of the Palestinians that
fled Palestine during and after the war rushed into Jordan. Jordan's
government made conditions as liveable as possible for the refugees.
Israel's occunation of the West Bank and Jerusalem in the
1967 war strengthened-the ties between Jordan and the Palestinians.
The West Bank and Jerusalem had been under Jordan's control since
shortly after the 1948 war. The splitting of the East and West
Banks fueled a Palestinian resistance movement that had begun in
1966. Palestinian guerrillas used Jordan as a base of operations
for their attacks on Israel.
Jordan, and her ruler, King Hussein, did everything possible
to aid the guerrillas. Hussein was even thought to be one of the
prime representatives of the Palestinian people. Disagreements over
the raids into Israel soon brought Hussein and the Palestinians into
conflict. Attempts to remove Hussein from power were made in 1970.
The situation worsened so much that Hussein was forced to drive the
guerrillas out of Jordan in September, 1970. The situation in
Jord~ ir september, 1970 will be discussed more fully in another
0
sect~on.
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redress Palestinian grievances were also hotly debated:
As far as territorial issues are concerned, there is
unanimity among the Egyptians: they are firmly committed to a
complete recovery of the Arab lands occupied by Israel since 1967.
The unaniznt{Y, however, does not extend to the means of achieving
this goal.

Differences with the different Palestinian groups have influenced Egypt's domestic and foreign policy:
These questions have not only created domestic dissension
in Egypt but also have caused an occasional deterioration of its
relations with Syria, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and the Palestine
Liberation Organization. r~ei ther the charismatic ~Jasser nor the
pragmatic Sadat were able to create a domestic or a regional unity
on these issues, which have remained the most ~nizing concern
of the Egyptian people and their policymakers.
Difficult domestic conditions in the early 1970's led President
Sadat to rethink Egypt's foreign policy.

Though Egypt's relationship

with the Palestinia.'ls was of prime concern, Sadat believed he had to
concentrate on Egypt's domestic problems before internal uprisings
developed.

Yet, instead of working on these problems, Sadat launched

a surprise attack on Israel in October, 1973.

The war was supposed to

be a great Victory for Egypt which would allow Sadat to repair the
troubled conditions in Egypt.
Abraham Wagner details Sadat' s attitude toward using Egyptian
resources to aid non-Egyptian groups, including the Palestinians, before
and after the October War:
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There are amnle indications that before the October War,
Sadat wanted to turn inward and away from pan-Arab issues, such
as Palestine, in order to concentrate his efforts on solving Egypt's
social and economic problems. The pan-Arab issue, he believed, had
deprived Egypt of vital resources desperately needed for domestic
development. • ,Sadat, who is by no me~~ an isolationist, would
prefer to expend his nation's scarce resources and energies in
strengthening the economy rather than in encouraging the overthrow
of regimes deemed unfriendly to Egypt.13
Egypt's defeat in the October War convinced Sadat that violence
was not the way to secure peace and prosperity for Egypt.
situation was worsened by the war.

The domestic

Sadat believed that Egypt could not

afford, either economically or emotionally, another war with Israel.
Sadat's peacemaking journey to Jerusalem in November, 1977 was a direct
res~t

of this belief.

Sadat hoped that his peace initiative would

also help the Palestinians.

The impact of Sadat's efforts on the

Palestinians will be covered later.
Israel's victory in the 1948 war precipitated the Palestinian
Problem.

Next to the Palestinians themselves, Israel has become the

single most important entity involved in the search for a solution to
the Palestinian Problem.

Israel's importance to the problem rests in

the fact that the land the Palestinians claim to be their home is now
occupied by the state of Israel.
Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories is also a matter of debate,
Said have diverging opinions,

Once again Samuel Katz and Edward

Katz feels that Israel's management of

the Palestinians in the occupied territories has been more than fair:
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The Israeli government has also gone to great lengths,
probably unprecedented in the history of military occupations,
both to create an easy and relaxed relationship with the people
and to improve their lot. From the beginning, it established
the principle of not interfering with the tenor and manner of
life and of the Arab population, with only two exceptions. First,
it insisted on the political propaganda and ••• the second
exception consisted in a considerable expenditure of money and
effort and e~pertise to imnrove the economic condition of the
population,! Said's opinion of Palestinian life inside the occupied territories is less favorable than the one g1 ven by Katz.

Said states 1

There are Zionism and Israel for Jews, and Zionism for
non-Jews. Zionism has drawn a sharp line between Jew and non-Jew:
Israel built a whole system for keeping them apart, including the
much admired (but completely apartheid) kibbutzim, to which no
Arab has ever belonged. In effect, the Arabs are ruled by a
senarate government premised on the impossibility of isonomic
rule for both Jews and non-Jews.15
Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai has
been a mixed blessing for Israel.

One of the good things to come out

of the occupation was an improvement in Israel's geographic security.
The acquisition of the territories expanded Israel's borders which made
the physical defense of Israel somewhat easier.

A boost to Israeli

morale was another plus provided by the occupation in 1967.
\fhile Israel's security against external attack may have been
imnroved by the increase in territory, her internal security has been
greatly threatened by the occupation.

The danger to Israel's security

comes from the vast resources that must be expended on maintaining a
force of occupation in the territories acouired in 1967.

Financial and

emotional resources must be tanped in order to protect the territories
from attack by Palestinian guerrillas.
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Management of the occupied territories has become a vicious
circle for Israel.

In order to protect Israeli citizens from Pales-

tinian attacks, which are in retaliation to the occupation, the Israeli
army has become a force of occupation in these areas.

The army

kee~s

tight control on the movement and political freedoms of Palestinians
in these areas.

Lack of political freedoms and freedom of movement

lead the Palestinians to subversive action in Israel and give Palestinian groups outside Israel justification to attack Israel in the name
of their brothers inside Israe1. 16
Thus, actions taken by Israel to enhance security really
jeopardize that security.

Israel's domestic problems, "a worsening

economy, increases in taxes, inflation, unemployment, and emigration",!?
coupled with her security concerns, could bring about Israel's collapse.
For this reason and for the emotional well-being of her

peo~le

it

behooves Israel to try and find a solution to the Palestinian Problem.
Improving the quality of life of Palestinians in the occupied
territories would go a long way toward paving the road to a solution.
Opportunities for Palestinian education is a case in point as this
descrintion of the Israeli school system demonstrates!
Parents may send their children to either tyPe of public
school--or to nrivate school, some of which are run by various
Christian denominations. There is little co-education between
Israeli Arabs and Jews. Educational attainment of the Arab
population is ~uch lower than the norm, and the university dropout
rate is high.t
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Writing in Time Magazine, Otto Freidrich elaborates on the poor
condition of Arab education in Israel:
Though Arab and Israeli children now learn each other's
in Jerusalem classrooms, they still go to separate schools.
Officials like to boast not only that many new classrooms have been
built (152 last year) but that Arab schools are just as good as
Jewish ones (and much better than what the Arabs had in the past).
Separate but equal is what the doctrine used to be called in the
u.s. and the Suureme Court condemned it forever by ruling that
separate schools are inherently unequal.19
l~~guages

Practices like these have instigated many Palestinian commando
raids against Israel.

Innocent Israeli families receive the brunt of

the violence in these attacks.

Roger Rosenblatt details the aftermath

of one of these raids:
Einat, 5, and Yael, 2, were both killed in April, 1979
when terrorists entered ~ahariya from the sea in a motor-powered
dinghy and attacked a four-story apartment house. In one apartment
they found Einat and her father, whom they took back to the beach.
Danny they shot to death and, when Israeli forces approached, one
of the terrorists picked up Einat by the feet and cracked open her
head on a rock.
Yael died differently. When the terrorists burst in on
their apartment, Semadar and Yael were in a utility room, where
they remained in hiding. Yael started to cry. In order to keep
her daughter quiet, Semadar clamped her hand over her mouth very
hard. It is believed that she inadvertently suffocated the child.
When the story was published, it drove the entire nation into
profound mourning. There was Israel's history in a single incidents
the nation continually at war; the nation as mother protecting her
children; the nation unwittingly suffocating her young for the wars
in which it was caught. 20
A conversation Roger Rosenblatt had with a Palestinian named
Nabil depicts the pain felt by Palestinians in the occupied territories.
Nabil told Rosenblatt:
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One night last year, for instance, three other boys and I
were returning home from a dance. A jeep pulled up. The soldiers
demanded our identity cards. Then they took us with them. I asked
why - when we had our cards. I got slapped for that. We were
taken to the military center, where we were made to lie down in the
street. Then they transferred us to a cell about 1.5 meters high.
You could not sit up. There was almost no air. My friend asked
for water; he got sla!JPed for that. 'What makes :people behave this
way?' I asked one of the soldiers. He said: 'We are not policymakers. We are just taking orders' . 21
There will be no end to the mutual suffering the Palestinians
and Israelis feel until a settlement of the Palestinian Problem has been
reached.

N'o settlement can be hoped for unless the final status of

Jerusalem has been agreed upon.

Jerusalem's status is another matter

of great debate.
While Jerusalem is of great importance to a settlement, its
status is hardly mentioned in any discussions or documents.

Lord

Caradon, a member of the National Defense University, points this out:
Jerusalem means the City of Peace. And in all the surrounding uncertainties, one thing cannot by disputed. There will be no
peace in the Holy Land without a peace in Jerusalem.
Yet the question of how peace can be achieved in Jerusalem
is postponed, avoided, or neglected. In the Camp David concluding
document Jerusalem was not even mentioned,
No problem amongst the many disputes of the Middle East
raises more difficulties, excites more deep emotions, or commands
more intense loyalties than the question of the future of Je~salem,
and no other danger is treated with such an ominous silence. 2
Lord Caradon believes that there will not be a settlement to
the Palestinian Problem and no

ch~~ce

for peace in the Middle East due

to the debate over Jerusalem.

Caradon says:
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'Ihe fear is that intense feeling over the future of
Jerusalem will increase animosities and stand in the way of a
peaceful settlement, eventually bring about bloodshed and destruction on a scale not so far imagined, not only to the Holy City but
to all those engaged in the conflict.
What a tragedy it would be if Jerusalem thus became itself
the impediment to peace, the central cause of continuing conflict.23
Otto Freidrich echoes Lord Caradon's thoughts on

Je~1salem's

importance to peace in the Middle East:
Of all the conflicts betw~en Jews a..'ld Arabs, that over
Jerusalem is the most complex and intractable. It is so deeply
rooted in centuries of political and religious strife that each
side is ~sionately determined to have its way. As there is no
settlement, every terrorist bomb on the West Bank contains the
danger of escalation: rioting, warf~~· spreading oil cutoffs, a
new confrontation of the superpowers.
Passions reign high in the struggle over Jerusalem's future.
Arab and Jews have drawn battle lines around their positions from
which they will not budge.

Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem,

presents the Israeli case:
There are some Israelis who would give up the Gol~~. some
Israelis who would give up the Sinai, and some who would give up
the West Bank. But I do not think you can find any Israelis who
are willing to give up Jerusalem. They cannot and will not. This
beautiful, golden city is the heart and soul of the Jewish people.
You cannot live without a heart and soul. If you want one sim'Ole
word to symbolize all of Jewish history, that would be Jerusal~m.25
Responding to Teddy Kollek, Walid Khalidi makes these remarks:
Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is
the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron
to the south. Together with its Arab suburbs, it is the largest
Arab urban concentration on the !.fest Bank. It is the former
capital of the sanjak (district) of Jerusalem under the Ottomans,
as well as of mandatory Palestine. The highest proportion of the
Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It
is the site of the holiest Huslim shrines on Palestinian soil. .. It
contains the oldest religious endowments of the Palestinians, their
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most prestigious secular institutions - the cumulative and priceless
patrimony of a millennium ~~d a quarter of residence, Architecturally it is distinctively Arab. In ownership and property, it ig
overwhelmingly so. It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.2
Israel's dominant status in any settlement to the Palestinian
Problem will remain solid as long as Jerusalem is under Israeli occupation.

'Ihe future of Jerusalem will have to be determined before any

settlement to the Palestinian Problem can be found.

Deep Arab and

Jewish emotions toward Jerusalem make this task appear nearly impossible.
Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Palestinian Problem is directly
related to the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States.
United States depends on Saudi oil and
moderate stance.

o~

The

the Saudi's politically

Saudi Arabia is one of the few Middle Eastern countries

with which the United States has been able to develop a good relationship.
The loss of the Iranian ally has made the U.s. -saudi bond even more
important to the United States.
Anything that

end~~gers

the stability and security of Saudi Arabia

is potentially devastating to the United States,

The Palestinian Problem

is one issue that could upset Saudi security and stability.

Former

President Richard M. Nixon makes this point very clears
The Saudis are concerned that any settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict that does not resolve the Palestinian problem will
increase the militancy of the Palestinians. In 1976 the Palestinian
Liberation Orga.~ization disrupted Lebanon, plunging it into civil
war. During my administration they tried twice within three months
to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan, they set off a civil war in
that country, and they almost succeeded in bringing about the fall
of its government. Terrorism is the PLO's stock-in-trade, and
Saudi Arabia is extremely vulnerable to terrorist activities; two
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thirds of the workers in its oil fields are Palestinians. In
addition, anything that strengthens the hand of the Arab radicals
as an unsatisfactory settlement would weaken the ~sition of the
moderate Saudi leadership.27
Saudi Arabia's value to the United States has been demonstrated
in two recent incidents.

First, the Saudis were "instrumental in

helping the United States control the Syrian missile crisis in mid1981." 28 Secondly, the Saudis were helpful "in arranging the related
Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in Lebanon in July, 1981." 29
Writing in his book, The Kingdom, Robert Lacey relates King
Faisal's fear of the Palestinians:
What worried him was the bitterness the Palestinians felt
towards their brother Arabs. Desperate men with nothing to lose,
the Palestinians had, within a matter of years, come to represent
a major threat of any Arab regime which had not done enough, in
their opinion, to help secure their rights. Placating them was
more than a matter of morality; it was a question of survival.30
The latest example of Saudi activism in the search for a
settlement to the Palestinian Problem was Crown Prince Fahd's peace
pro:posal in August, 1981.

Fahd devised his plan as an alternative to
the Camp David peace process, which he branded a failure.3 1
Directly contrasting Saudi Arabia's moderate political positions
is the Middle East's most radical state, Libya.

Libya's leader, Muammar

Gaddafi, is one of the most destabilizing factors in the Middle East.
Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation
Organization is quite dangerous to a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian Problem.
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Writing in the Armed Forces Journal International, Yossef
Bodansky describes the Libyan-8oviet-PLO relationship:
On this level of clandestine activities, the SovietLibyan-FLO partnership is the most active. Libya allows PLO
troops to train with conventional heavy weapons, particularly
aircraft and tanks, which cannot be placed at their disposal
anywhere else. In October, 1978, Arafat claimed that Palestinian
squadrons stationed in Libya were operating r!ig-211 Mig-23 1 and
Mirage 5 aircraft. Tank aD~ missile units are likewise placed at
the disposal of the Fatah.J
In addition to training and arming Palestinian guerrillas,
Gaddafi has done much more to upset the delicate balance that barely
holds the Middle East together.

On August 19 1 19811 Libyan fighter

planes attacked u.s. naval aircraft that were on maneuvers in the Gulf
of Sidra.

Gaddafi ordered the U.s. planes to be attacked because they

had entered the Gulf of Sidra, which he claimed was inside Libya's
200-mile territorial waters.

The U.S. planes promptly shot down the

Libyan aircraft.
Some observers saw this action as "a deli berate U.s. provocation".33

Other observers feel that Libya instigated the action by
attacking planes that were over international waters.34
Gaddafi has also been linked to assassination attempts on
Euro~an

and American diplomats.

There also are questions on Gaddafi's

possible role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

Finally, in

December, 1981 u.s. intelliger.ce agencies received information stating
that Muammar Gaddafi had sent hit teams to the United States to kill
President Reagan and other top u.s. officials.35

34

The setting in the Middle East is volatile enough without
Gaddafi's disruptive influence.

Gaddafi's Libya threatens to ruin any

possibility for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem.

The atmosphere

must be just right for negotiations of this kind and Libya's actions
continually muddle the atmosPhere. *

*For

further discussions on the problems between Palestini~~s
and Jews sees Politics in the Middle East by James Bill and Carl
Leiden, The Near East by William Yale, and The Battle for Peace by
Ezer Weizman.
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PAlESTINIAN

REPRESE~'TATION

Representation of the dispersed

Palestini~~

people has been a

great question of debate since Israel's victory in the first Arab-Israeli
War.

The debate moves along a number of levels.

First, the debate

centered on which country or group should be the sole representative of
the Palestinians.
level.

Once this was decided, the debate moved to another

Now the question was how effective could the group representing

the Palestinians be, if Israel and other states dealing with the Palestinian Problem would not meet or even acknowledge that group as the
representative of the Palestinians •

•

Prior to 1962, for the most part, there was no universal
Palestinian entity.

Palestinians living in refugee camns in different

countries knew only the Palestinians in that camp or that country.
T!hile the desire for return to Palestine may have been universal, there
was no single movement, thought, or driving force that united the Palestinians politically.
Edward Said believes this lack of unity causes an identity
crisis for Palestinians.

He says:

Each Palestinian community must struggle to maintain its
identity on at least two levels: first, as Palestinian with regard
to the historical encounter with Zionism and the precipitous loss
of a homeland; second, as Palestinian in the existential setting of
day-to-day life res~nding to the pressure in the state of residence.
Every Palestinian has no state as a Palestinian even though he is
"of", without belonging to, a state in which at present he resides.1

J?
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With the

exce~tion

of a few groups that made commando raids

into Israel from Jordan and Lebanon in 1955, the Palestinians were
"politically passive until about 1962". 2
These military groups operated independently.

There was no

communication or organized plan between these early Palestinian groups.
It was

~ot

until the late 1950's and early 1960's that the need for a

concerted effort

develo~d

and took form.

Edward Said describes how

the Palestinian consciousness was born:
Limited in ~~se, cut off from one another, and clandestine, the groups defy the assemblage of an historical account.
No documentary records give a view of their gradual transformation
into political organizations. Indeed, we must look essentially to
Arabic literature, to poetry and fiction to get some "feel" of the
genesis of what later became the guerrilla movement. Put simply,
what appears to have occurred is that the young, raised on a
blurred memory of childhood, the tales of the elders, the sorrow,
privation, and humiliation of refugee life, came to feel a new
sense of romantic nationalism.3
The Palestinians needed a model to follow before they could
become engaged in an organized battle with the Israeli occupier.
William Polk feels the Algerian Revolution is the model the Palestinians
needed:
What was it that brought into a single focus this nostalgia
and partisan warfare? The most convincing answer, I think, was the
distantly perceived exam~le of Algeria.
The Algerian Revolution was adopted as a case study by those
Franz Fannon called "The Wretched of the Earth" --and by those who
opposed them. Fannon's own book became a clarion cry for radical
organizations just as Colonel Roger T.rinquier's La Guerre Moderne
became a guidebook on counterinsurgency warfare. In the Algerian
resistance movement, then apparently also disaffected, leaderless,
inchoate, and powerless, but beginning to achieve a kind of heroism,
the Palestinians found a family resemblance.4
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The first two grou:ps to become "the ouasi-official re!'resentatives of the Palestinian peonle" were the Harakat at-Tahrir al-Falastini,
or Fatah,

~~d

the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO.

the first of the organizations to a:ppear on the scene.

Fatah was

Fatah emerged

in 1965, but was never generally recognized.
The FLO, which became generally recognized as the representative
of the Palestinian people by the Palestinians and most Arab states,
started a little later.

The ?LO was the creation of

conference held in Alexandria on September 15, 1963.

~~

Arab summit

The next s:pring, a

group called the Palestine

~ational

Congress met in Jerusalem to discuss

the formation of the PLO,

King Hussein of Jordan opened the meeting by

promising that Jordan would provide carnns to train Palestinian guerrillas.
Palestinians critized the PLO as an organization that did
nothing more than soak u:p Palestinians to prevent them from acting
effectively.

Ahmad Shuqairi, the FLO chairman, was also criticized as

a poor leader.

Palestinians claimed he was a puppet of the Arab states

that had created the PL0.5
Palestinians believed that the true leader of the Palestinian
neonle would have to be an independent, not connected with a particular
Arab state.

One such leader was Yasir Arafat.

Arafat's credentials:

!Tilliam Polk describes
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The most significant of the Fatah leaders was Yasir Arafat.
Unlike Shuoairi, he was not the "chosen instrument" of any Arab
government. Of a poorer background, he had drunk the dregs of the
bitter cuP of sorrow and humiliation. Able and energetic, he
managed to acouire an education and to escape the camP life. Like
many-of the Fatah personnel, he was technically oualified (as an
engineer) but had not risen to a position of prominence in another
Arab country. 6
The PLO's prominence grew after Israel's victory in the 1967
war.

More territory had been occupied by Israel, along with the

Palestinians living on that territory.

The inadequacy of the Arab

armies against Israel was also very clear.
new and vibrant pla.l'l of attack.

The time had come for a

Leadership for the Palestinian people

was essential.
Palestinians of the older generation wanted leadership to come
from their own camps, interests, and local authorities.

Younger

Palestinians, however, thought the guerrillas of the PI.O and other
organizations should provide the leadership for the Palestinia.l'ls.

It

was this difference of opinion between older and younger Palestinians
that allowed the guerrillas to gain the UPper hand.
Although by now most Palestinians favored the guerrillas, the
guerrillas themselves were not united.

Aside from the PLO and Fatah,

two other groups gained importance after the 1967 war.

These two

groups were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and
Sa' iqah.

Sa' iqah was a group of comma.l'ldos controlled by the Syrian

army that operated from the Syrian and Jordanian borders.
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The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was a conglomeration of three different guerrilla grouus.

The leader of one of

these groups, George Habbash, became the leader of the Popular Front.
The Popular Front's radical social ideology separated it from the PLO
and Fatah.
Fatah was having the most luck with young Palestinians by the
end of 1967.

Support from Arab countries for the Palestinians was

still split among the different groups.

An Israeli raid in retaliation

to Fatah attacks in Israel may have been the deciding factor as to
which group would get Arab support.
On March 21, 1968 the Israeli army attacked the village of
Karamah, which was a Fatah staging area.

Although the Israelis won

militarily, Fatah pronounced the raid a psychological victory for the
Palestinian cause.

After this victory a Palestine National Council

was called in May, 1968.

The purpose of this council was to unify the

guerrilla groups under one organization, the PLO, which would receive
all Arab support.
that joined.

Fatah, the PLO, and Sa'iqah were the major groups

The Popular Front was still having internal disputes

over leadership and policies.

This argument led some members of the

Popular Front to leave and form the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, which became part of the PLO.
Fatah assumed leadershiu of the PLO in a 1969 PLO Congress in
Cairo.

The Pouular Front under George Habbash boycotted the Congress.

Yasir Arafat was elected Chairman of the PLO and Fatah took control of
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the organization.

The Popular Front remained outside of the FLO until

the group was forced to help the PLO battle the Jordanian army in 1970.
Palestinian unification was almost complete.

The guerrillas believed

they were near becoming an "effective political community".? Their
largest obstacle was the Jordanian government which began fighting the
guerrillas.

The fighting became heaviest in September, 1970, which

became known as "Black September".

The removal of the PLO from Jordan

was a result of this action. 8
The early 1970's were very important for the PLO.
~ations

voted to recognize the PLO on October 14, 1974.

105 yes votes and 20 abstentions.

.

The United
There were

Israel, the United States, the

Dominican Republic and Bolivia cast the only dissenting votes,

Later

that month, at a meeting of twenty Arab heads of state in Rabat,
Morocco, the FLO was recognized as "the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people on any liberated Palestinian territory".

The

dates of this meeting were October 26-28, 1974.9
The culmination of the FLO's efforts came on November 13, 1974
when its leader, Yasir Arafat, addressed the U.N. General Assembly.
This was a truly momentous occasion for "it was the first time that a
non-governmental organization had participated in an assembly debate." 10
It would seem that after all that had happened to the PLO in
the international arena a settlement to the Palestinian Problem could
have been reached somewhat more easily.

This was not to be, for Israel
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would not deal with the PLO.

Israel would rather deal with Jordan

than the PLO.
There are two main reasons for Israel's refusal to negotiate
with the PLO.

The first is that the PLO refuses to recognize the

existence of the state of Israel.

Secondly, Israel does not trust the

PLO because of terrorist acts it has committed in the past.

The killing

of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich is just one
example of terrorism conducted by the PLO.
Before going any further into the actions of the PLO, it is
important to learn something about terrorists in general.

•

The first

question to be asked is why terrorists engage in activities such as
bombings and airplane hijackings.
According to Jan Schreiber, the terrorist believes his aggressive actions are a reaction to someone else's aggression.

Most terror-

ists view themselves as having been forced by events beyond their
control to use violence.
especially true.

In the case of the Palestinians, this is

If the PLO did not undertake operations that spread

their actions across the front pages of the world's newspapers, their
cause would remain relatively unknown outside the Middle East.

Living

without a state of their own hampers the Palestinians' ability to sell
their cause to the world.

Violence, however, has the opposite effect
of turning people off of the cause of the group that uses violence. 11
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In his book, The Ultimate Weauon, Jan Schreiber describes a
tyuical terrorist.
PLO.

This

descri~tion

definitely covers members of the

Schreiber states:
In a world accustomed to nlacing more value on ends than
means, the terrorist is the su~reme pragmatist. 11To deed is too
brazen or too grisly, so long as it gets the job done: the change
of social structure or the sought-after revolution. Like anyone
who deals in the ~litics of power, he lives in a climate of moral
ambiguity. Reknown as a ~articularly heartless victimizer, he
often sees himself, by contrast, as society's victim, someone
driven to commit certain a~palling acts by the blatant insensitivity of the world to the needs and aspirations of the peonle he
represents.12
..
While the FLO did engage in this kind of activity, the mission

of the PLO has changed somewhat since it was accepted in the U. ~.
Basically, the PLO is less militant now that it is trying a political
solution to the Palestinian Problem.

Schreiber says thata

Clearly, however, by accepting potential political solutions
and the help of the great powers in arriving at them, the PLO had
committed itself to changing its image from that of unprincifled
cutthroat to patriotic freedom fighter and peace negotiator. 3
Terrorism and its inherent violence is destabilizing to world
security generally and, in

~articular,

to peace in the Middle East.

The death and destruction terrorism brings to innocent

peo~le

the world

over threatens to turn the different countries of the world into armed
cam-ps.
As noted earlier, the terrorism conducted by the PLO has brought
great pain and anguish to many on both sides of the Palestinian Problem.
The uncertainty, mistrust, and hatred caused by this terrorism has
severely damaged the chances for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem.
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Terrorism also upsets the ueaceful

mainten~~ce

relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
sides are taken in the Palestinian Problem,
and the Soviet Union w1 th the PLO.

The

of the superpower

As in any dispute,

u.s.

sides with Israel

Were it not for its part in the

Palestinian dispute, the Soviet Union would not have as firm a foothold
in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
The Middle East and the Persian Gulf are not the only places
the Soviet Union has used terrorist activity to its own advantage.
Observers note that by supplying and training different terrorist groups,
such as the PLO and Red Brigade, the Soviet Union can cause political
disruption in areas it normally would have no influence,

While using

the genuine concerns of local terrorist organizations as bait, the Soviet
Union lets these groups unwittingly accomplish tasks that would be
nolitically harmful if conducted by Soviet forces,

Responding to these

charges, the Soviet Union claims that the CIA is really behind international terrorism.
In his book, The Terror 1,!etwork, Claire Sterling disputes the
Soviet claim and sets the record straight:
Some have suggested that the CIA was egging on the enemy all
along. A surprising number of people abroad still think there are
no limits to the CIA's capabilities in this regard. I had no access
at all to the CIA while gathering material for this book, since its
agents were formally forbidden to talk to journalists abroad. I
couldn't swear then that the CIA had no connection whatever with the
planetary wave of terrorism described here, But it was certainly
not the CIA that ran guerrilla training camps for tens of thousands
of terrorists in Cuba, Yemen, North Korea, East Germany, Hungary,
Czechoslov~~ia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.
The CIA could not
have ~rovided, and evidently did not, the colossal supplies of
weanons emnloyed by the terrorists of four continents in Fright
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Decade I, or sanctuaries for their fugitives, or intelligence
information for their oneratives, or diulomatic cover in the
United ~.rations. 14
·
·
The FLO's refusal to recognize the existence of the state of
Israel has stalemated the process leading toward a settlement of the
Palestinian Problem.

Israel, as well as the United States, will not

deal with the PLO as long as it refuses to recognize Israel.
~~y

In fact,

country or diplomat who even suggests talking with the PLO suffers

the wrath of Israel and her proponents.

President Carter's Ambassador

to the United Nations, Andrew Young, is a case in point:
Many blacks were outraged by what they perceived to be the
forced resignation of Andrew YoQ~g as ambassador to the United
Tl!ations in August, 19?9 for holding a co!1versation with the U. ~r.
representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. United
States' ~licy, like Israeli policy, was to have nothing to do
with the PLO Q~til it disavowed terrorism and recognized Israel's
right to exist. After his resignation, Young made clear his
oninio!1 that a prohibition on talking to the PLO carried this
nolicy too far and ignored a nolitical reality in the Middle
East,15
Although the PLO must have been pretty successful to have been
admitted to the United Nations, the effectiveness of this organization
has been questioned.

Once again, it is Samuel Katz and Edward W, Said

that come down on different sides of the Palestinian fence.

Samuel

Katz questions the bravery of the PLO and of the support it received
from Palestinians:
Fatah onerations against Israel, first launched in 1965,
were planned in Syria. The fighters first crossed into Jordan or
sometimes into Lebanon and from there infiltrated directly into
Israel. All the attacks were hit-and-run raids on civilian targets,
and seldom did they stray far from the border. For Fatah members
could not exnect shelter from the Palestinian Arabs, whether in
Jordan-occupied Judea and Samaria or in Israel. With few exceptions,
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the "Palestinian reople" were not involved at all, nor did they
offer any substantial cooneration, even passive, in these operations,16
Edward Said believes the PLO has been very successful and
innovative for three reasonsa
First, the PLO consciously undertook to be responsible for
all Palestini~~s - those in exile, those under occupation, those
inside Israel • . • Secondly, the PLO used its international authority
to interpret the Palestinian reality, which had been obscured from
the world for almost a century, to the world and, more important,
to Palestinians themselves ••• Third, the PLO as a political organization was decisively orened on all sides to admit the entire
community to its ranks.17
The claim, that Palestinian terrorism is no better or worse
than the terrorism used by Israelis against the British, is often not
heard over the righteous indignation voiced by the Israelis.

It should

not be forgotten that Israeli terrorist groups such as the Haganah,
Stern

Grou~,

Irgun and the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel launched

raids and attacks against the British that were just as bloody as any
conducted by the PLO against Israel in the 1960's.

The bombing of the

King David Hotel, in which ninety-one people were killed and forty-five
wounded, is just one of the more explicit examples.

The bombing was

conducted by the Irgun, which was headed by Menachem Begin, the nresent
Prime Minister of Israel.

In light of his past,

complaints made by
Begin about terrorist activities against Israel border on the ironic. 18
~~Y

Finally, in order to truly represent the Palestinian people
effecti ve1y, the PLC Hi:!.l have to make some changes in its policy.

'The

PIC will have to recognize Israel's right to exist and halt its acts of
terror.

Former President '!ixon gives his oninion of what policies the
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representative of the Palestinians should follow:
First, whatever group does in fact or claims to represent
the Palestinians must recognize Israel's right to exist in peace
and must reject the use of terrorism or armed action against Israel
or Israeli citizens.19
It remains to be seen if the PLO will heed President Nixon's
advice, *

*For

a detailed analysis of the forms and causes of guerrilla
and terrorist activity, see Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare edited
by Sam C. Sarkesian.
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'1l1E PALESTBTI ANS Al!JJ nrE U.S •

The

u.s.

P~estinian

Problem has been a source of major concern for

policymakers since the formation of the state of Israel.

This

nroblem became u.rominent during the Eisenhower administration and has
intensified ever since.
a

~lan

Although Secretary of State Dulles presented

for the settlement of the

~oblem

in 1955, the Eisenhower admin-

istration was more concerned about Soviet involvement in the Middle East.
Eisenhower believed that much of the instability in the Middle
East was fomented by international communism under the direct control
of the Soviet Union.

In response to this belief the Eisenhower Doctrine,

whieh called for U.S. military and economic assistance to countries in
the Middle East as a means of countering Soviet policy in the area, was
formulated by the administration and approved by Congress in March of

1957.

1
Middle East

administration.

~licy

did not change much during the Kennedy

One reason for this being that President Kennedy's

Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had been a friend and admirer of John
Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State.
the attitude of American Middle East

William Polk details

~licymakers:

Moreover, the Department of State - both in the nerson of
the Secretary and the officers at the "working level" - continued
to hold the view of the American long-term interests and objectives
in the Middle East which underlay the policy of the previous administration. The emphasis on military overflight rights, continuation
of the flow of petroleum on acceptable terms to Europe, and, above
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all, prevention of the real or ostensible incursion of the Soviet
Union into the Mediterranean area underlay the oolicies of both
administrations.2
Once again the Palestine Problem took a back seat to other
More importantly, the one plan that the Kennedy admin-

consideratio~s.

istration developed never got off the ground because the administration
refused to face resistance from Israel and Jewish-American
at home.

resista~ce

The plan, written by Dr. JosePh Johnson, met such strong

resistance because it called for the voicing of

~eferences

by the

Palestinians and Israel would have nothing to do with the Palestinians.
The lack of U.S. resolve in pursuing its plan is an example of American
unwillingness to go against the wishes of Israel.

This unwillingness

is a problem that still plagues u.s. policy in the Middle East today.3
President Nixon, who took office in 1969, viewed world events
almost exclusively from the perspective of the U.s.-u.s.s.R. superpower
relationship.
terms.

Nixon's Middle East policy was therefore set in these

The Palestinian Problem once again became a matter of secondary

importance.

In addition to making U.S. Middle East policy take the

wrong approach to the Palestinian Problem, Nixon's obsession with the
Soviet Union led to the total ecliose of U.S. Middle

~astern

policy by

the attention given to the war in Vietnam and the opening of China.
These two events were Nixon's means of combatting Soviet communism.
Nixon and his National Security Affairs Adviser, Henry Kissinger,
did not deal with the Middle East until events forced them to do so,
Further

wea~ening

U.S. policy in the Middle East was the fact that
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Kissinger was not directly involved.

The conduct of

u.s.

policy in the

area was left to Secretary of State William P. Rogers who was neither
strong nor assertive.
for a viable

u.s.

Kissinger's aggressiveness is what was needed

nolicy in the Middle East.

This difference in person-

alities led to many clashes in foreign policy until Kissinger later
became both National Security Affairs Adviser and Secretary of State.
In addition to differences in personality, there were also
differences in the way the White House and the State Department viewed
the situation in the Middle East.

Writing in his book, Decade of

Decisions, William Quandt describes these differences:
The president and Kissinger seemed to be chiefly worried
by the global ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict, r-rixon
repeatedly used highly colored and explosive imagery in describing
the area. Again and again the theme of confrontation between the
superpowers was mentioned,
The State Denartment professionals tended to agree that
the situation i~ the Middle East was dangerous, but their perceptions were more affected by the threats to United States'
interests arising from trends in the area. At State, one heard
of the "erosion" of American influence, of "deterioration" of '}j,he
American position, of "radicalization", and of "polarization".
Rogers and the State

~partment

toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

wanted to develop a new nolicy

Busy with Vietnam and China, Nixon

allowed Rogers to go ahead in the creation of a new Middle Sast policy.
This policy became known as the Rogers Plan.
if given a

cha~ce

Although the Rogers Plan

might have brought a limited peace to the Middle Sast,

it, like most other plans for peace in the Middle East, did not deal
with the main cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

American policymakers

had not then learned and are just now realizing that the

Palestinia~

Problem ;-r1.ll have to be settled before any comprehensive :!='.eace in the
Middle 3ast can be established.
The Jordanian crisis of September, 1970 was one of the few times
U.S. policymakers and diplomats dealt with issues directly involved with
the Palestinian Problem.

Instead of aggressively seeking a settlement

to the problem after the crisis, the United States entered a neriod of
"standstill diplomacy" that lasted from 1970 to 1973.5
Failure by the

u.s.

to pursue a vigorous policy in the Middle

Sast, one that would lead to a return of the occupied territories and
a settlement to the Palestinian Problem, created a pressure-cooker effect
in the• Middle East.

It exploded into war in October, 1973.

Once again

the United States and its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were nresented with an opportunity to do something constructive in the Middle Sast.
ifhen at last he did take over

u.s.

policy in the area, in

response to the October War, Kissinger's choice of step-by-step diplomacy,
while not settling the Palestinian Problem, may have created a situation
that would allow negotiations on the problem to take place.

Kissinger

felt that, by taking different issues separately or one step at a time,
a solution to the whole Arab-Israeli problem could be found.

Kissinger's

shuttle diplomacy hel,ed to nroduce some success in achieving his stenby-sten nrocess. *

*This

change of policy was a reaction to the gas lir.es resulting from OPSC's 1973 oil embargo, See The Middle ~ast: Oil, Politics
and Develonment edited by John Duke Anthony for a detailed discussion
of OPSC' s threat to U.S. interests in the !1iddle 3ast.
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The main problem with Kissinger's policies was that they did
not include the Palestinians,
to the

~roblem

Policymakers believed that a settlement

could be reached after peace had been achieved.

William

Quandt describes this deadly fallacy:
The United States has refrained from taking a clear
position on the issues regarding the Palestinians. In view of
their complexity, this may have been a reasonable posture in the
short term, but at some point the United States will have to
confront the ~uestion of Palestinian partici~ation in peace
negotiations,
The Carter administration, which took control in 1977, finally
changed the American reluctance to deal with the ?alestinian Problem,
The change in American nolicy is recounted by William Polk:
The President realized that American Middle Eastern ~olicy
had hit a dead end with the conclusion of the Sinai Accord in
Se~tember, 1975 precisely because it had been designed to avoid
the problem of the Palestinians. , .Carter had a remote sympathy
for the Palestinians. What they said they wanted or he assumed
they wanted made sense to Carter as a man concerned with human
rights. 7
According to Polk, "the Palestinian issue was one on which,
a~parently,

ment."8

President Carter felt a personal, even a religious. commit-

?resident Carter felt so strongly about the Palestinians that

he shocked everyone during a town meeting in Clinton,Hassachusetts.

At

this meeting President Carter announced the three conditions he felt
were needed for neace in the Middle East.
tion of Israel's right to exist
frontiers.
been

~~d

The first two were recogni-

the establishment of nermanent

There Has nothing new about these conditions for they had

linch~ins

of American policy for ouite a long time.

It was

President Carter's third condition, the need for a homeland for the
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Palestinians had never before been

~art

of an official policy of an

American president.
President Carter's beliefs were not
were soon to be rewarded.

President

~~war

journey to Jerusalem in Yovember, 1977.

~~founded

and his actions

Sadat made his historic

This visit led to the better-

ment of relations between Israel and Egypt.

These new relations between

Israel and Egypt led President Carter to ask Prime Minister Menachem
Begin of Israel and President Sadat of

E~t

to come to Camp David for

peace negotiations that would be mediated by President Carter himself.
The negotiations at Camp David were unique.

William Polk explains:

The Camp David meetings were perhaps the most remarkable
diplomatic event of this century. Quite a~art from the substance
of the discussions, the fact that the heads of state from three
states suspended all other activities for thirteen days was unprecedented. The informality of the meetings, contrasted shar~ly with
the usual dinlomatic interchan~e in which formality and nrotocol
were nearly as important as substance.9
The Camp David Accords, signed on Sentember 17, 1978, were made
up of two

se~arate

documents.

The first document was a "Framework for

Peace in the Middle East", written mostly by President Carter, which
set

u~

Egy~t

the manner in which neace in the Middle East could be reached.
and Israel also agreed to the concluding of a peace treaty within

three months of Camp David.

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was

signed on March 26, 1979 at the White House.

This treaty ended the

state of belligerency between Israel and Egypt and dictated the start
of normal relations between the two countries.
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President Carter's "framework" document is far more interesting
for it lays out the process by which the West

B~~

and Gaza, Palestinian

territories occupied by Israel, were to be dealt with.
for a five-year

tra~sition

'Ihe plan called

period in which a self-governing authority

would be elected by the people in these territories.

Once this authority

had been elected, Israel would remove its military government and
civilian administration from the territories.

This was to be done so

that full autonomy could be given to the inhabitants of the terri tory.
Jordan would also be asked to participate in the negotiations that would
settle the arrangements for this transition period.
The document also stated that Egypt, Israel, and Jordan would
determine the

ma~ner

would be established.

in which the elected self-governing authority
:·regotiations to determine the '?QWers and resoon-

sibilities of the authority were also to take place.

Palestinians from

the West Bank and Gaza and any "other Palestinians as mutually agreed"
could enter into these negotiations.
The transition period would begin once the self-governing
authority or administrative council was established.
last five years.

This period would

By the third year of this transition period, negotia-

tions to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and to
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, are to be initiated.
These negotiations are to be
period.

~gypt,

i~abitants

com~leted

by the end of the transition

Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the

of the West Bank

a~d

Gaza would constitute the committee
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that determines the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

The com-

mittee to conclude the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan would be
made up of re"Oresentati ves of Israel , Jordan and the inhabitants of the
West

B~~

and Gaza.

The search for a self-governing authority has not yet ended,
Autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt, for Jordan has not entered the
negotiations, have made little if any progress.
did bring about a separate peace between Israel
can be no more than a guide for

~~y

The Camp David Accords
~~d

Egypt. but they now

settlement of the Palestinian

Unless drastic measures are taken by the U.s., the Cam-p David

Problem.

Accords will become just another miserable attemnt at settling the
'!'I'Oblem.
Before discussing the inadeouacies of the Camp David Accords
and making any suggestions on what U.S. policy should be toward the
Palestinian Problem, the Reagan administration will have to be examined.
President Reagan, like other presidents before him, views the
world in terms of the U.s.-u.s.s.R. superpower relationship.

Reagan,

however, lets this view rule his policies to a greater extent than any
previous president.
this view.

Alexander Haig, Reagan's Secretary of State, shares

Together they intend to form a "strategic consensus" in the

Middle Bast to protect American interests by keeping the Soviets out.
Walid Khalidi examines Haig's attitudes toward the Middle East:
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But the predomin~~tly geonolitical lens through which he
views the ~riddle East can only heighten concern. jH thout as yet
having scrutinized the contents of the ~iddle East box (including,
inter alia, the Palestine nroblem and the Arab-Israeli conflict),
~.r. Haig nronoses to wra-p it in a "strategic consensus" between
the Israelis- and the Arabs in the face of the u.s.s.R.10
Reagan and his policymakers' efforts to form a "strategic
consensus" against

~~e

Soviet Union will delay, if not derail, other

efforts being made to settle the Palestinian Problem.

A closer relation-

ship with Israel will undoubtedly be the result of this "strategic
consensus".

According to Khalidi, "All this appears to indicate the

Palestinian issue has been shelved by the Reagan Administration." 11
These !'Qlicies could not have cow;: at a worse tine and be so
harmful to American interests.

Reag~l"l

thinks that "shelving" the

Palestinian Problem and forming a "strategic
will enhance and protect u.s. interests.
true.

c01·~sensus"

with Israel

Ironically, the opposite is

By putting the Palestinian Problem aside, Reagan is in reality

clearing an open path into the Middle East for the U.S.S.R.

Increased

U.s. sup!X)rt of Israel at this time will also be harmful instead of
hel!'ful to Amertcan interests.
Walid Khalidi explains the effect non-resolution of the Palestinian Problem and u.s.

sup~rt

of Israel has had on the Arabs, u.s.,

and U.s .s .R.:
(1) They have resulted in the deepening and perpetuation
of Arab political alienation from the iiest ••• American sponsorship
of Israel and a perceived unwillingness to solve the Palestine
problem largely counterbalanced the positive effects of decolonizatio'!". on Arab-\-l'estern relations, 'd'i th West European colonial disengagement completed, the onus of the non-resolution of the Palestine
problem was shifted increasingly to the United States,
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(2) At the same time, the attractiveness of Soviet military
and di~lomatic help has increased in proportion to American backing
of Israel. In fact, the Palestine problem provided the main Soviet
entree into the Arab world.
(3) The non-resolution of the Palestine problem has
su~plied the most powerful motivation (and rationalization) for
continued (Arab) reliance on the U.S.S.R.
(4) Western military support of Israel has led to Soviet
military support of the Arabs, The vicious circle this established
has reinforced the Arab emotional and intellectual tilt in favor of
the Soviets, especially with the younger generations,12
In light of this &.'lalysis, it can easily be seen that Reagan's
Middle Eastern policies are counterproductive,

u.s.

policy and diplomacy

in the !1iddle East has generally been shortsighted and, at times, selfdefeating,
ian Problem.

This is especially true with policy concerning the PalestinThe problem with America's policy in the Middle East is

that it is not based on the most important factors present in the Middle
East,

William R. Polk describes on what the main lines of American

policy in the Middle Sast are baseds
In large part, they were inherited from Great Britain,
transferred from other areas, or grew out of American domestic
attitudes; only in small part were they adjusted to or in resonance
with the hopes and fears of Middle Easterners. Therein lies much,
but not all, of the cause of their shortfalls and disappointments.
Too little did Americans perceive the Arabs and too little did the
Arabs perceive Americans, f~ cushion our joint passage through the
stormy postwar generation.
The main problem with U.S. policy and diplomacy in the Middle
East has been a failure or unwillingness to recognize the fact that
there could not be any peace or security in the Middle Sast until a just
settlement to the Palestinian Problem has been fOQ'ld.
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The only way to end the threat of Soviet involvement in the
Middle East is to eliminate the justification for Soviet presence in
the area.

This justification, as aptly demonstrated by Walid Khalidi,

is the non-resolution of the Palestinian Problem and the blind support
of Israel by the U.s.
President Reagan and his policvmakers must realize that shying
away from the Palestinian Problem is the worst thing that can be done.
The time has come for some immediate and drastic moves by the U.s. to
get the problem settled.

These moves will be drastic because they will

not be what Israel would wish us to do.

u.s.

policy must start dealing

with the Middle East as a whole, without again allowing Israel to become
an albatross.

American acquiescence to every whim of Menachem Begin and

Israel must end if U.S. interests in the area are to be

~rotected.

America's position in the Middle East can be enhanced only if
the

u.s.

makes its own foreign policy instead of letting Israel decide

what policies the

u.s.

should follow.

There are many things Israel is

doing that endangers peace in the Middle East that the U.s. should be
speaking out against.

Begin's decision to make Jerusalem the capital

of Israel, the increasing number of settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza, the illegal use of American planes sold to Israel to bomb the
Iraqi reactor, and the annexation of the Golan Heights are just a few
examples.
The

u.s.

should have policies designed to punish Israel when

acts such as these are committed.

The use of American planes in the
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bombing destruction of the Iraqi reactor is a special case in point.
The agreement between the

u.s.

and Israel that allowed the sale of the

nlanes said they could be used for defensive purposes only.

The bombing

can in no way be construed as anything but an offensive act.

The bomb-

ing, therefore, was

1~

violation of American law and Israel should have

been punished.

u.s.

support of Israel is important and the U.S. should not

a bandon Israel, but this support should not go to the extent that it

u.s. actions, as it does now. Charles
why u.s. policymakers are reluctant to go

handcuffs

McC. Mathias gives one

reason

against Israel:

American Preside~ts, and to ~~ even greater degree Senators
and Representatives, have been subjected to recurrent pressures from
what has come to be known as the Israel lobby, For the most part
they have been responsive, and for reasons not always related either
to personal conviction or careful reflection on the national interest ••• It is rather to suggest that, as a result of the activities
of the lobby, congressional conviction has been measurably reinforced by the knowledge that nolitical s~~ctions will be applied by
any who fail to deliver ,14
·John C. Campbell pinpoints the problem with non-resolution of
the

Palestini~~

Problem:

The Palestine ouestion remains a formidable obstacle and
burden to u.s. relations with the Arab world. It undermines the
moderates and strengthens the wild men. It plays into the hands
of the Soviet Union. It threatens to isolate the United States
with Israel as the only friend in the region. A settlement may
not be possible; nor can we assume that a settlement, if reached,
would end Arab-Israeli tension or tr~~sform America's relations
with the Arab world. Yevertheless, the effort must be made. 15
The

u.s.

has to make this effort now, before the situation in

the Middle East becomes so untenable that another war breaks out.

There
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are a. number of things the U.s. must do to get the negotiations on the
settlement of the Palestinian Problem going again.
encourage and actively seek the

~artici~a.tion

of Jordan and the Pales-

including the PLO, in these negotiations.

tini~~s.

The U.S. must

The PLO must be

brought into the discussion whether Israel likes it or not.

The u.s.

will have to prevail over Israel in the short term for the benefit of
long-term

and security,

~ea.ce

John

c.

Campbell explains:

The terms, of course, have to be negotiated by the ~arties,
Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians
(not excluding the PLO), ~~d that rea~res a. major endeavor to get
those parties talking to each other,!

~rincipally

The Israelis argue that they will not negotiate with the FLO
because of.its
Israel.

coven~~t

which denies the legitimacy of the state of

Kha.lidi believes the

"Coven~~t

is ma.xima.list, u."U'ealistic and

no basis for a settlement." 17 He also points out that the PLO has
softened some of its positions, especially those regarding armed
struggle and the formation of a ministate within the post-1967 occupied
18
territories,
Khalidi also correctly suggests that the Europeans could be
used by the

u.s.

in its attempt to get the PLO to enter the negotiations.

He says:
The Europeans could constructively focus attention on the
two princi-ples of "reci:!'I'ocity" and "coexistence" - the leaven for
a modus vivendi. They could draw out the PLO and the Arab radicals
on what they have been im-plying. They could elicit from Israel
responses, however guarded, about what in the circumstances it
might contemplate, Should the ~uroneans collectively ascertain
the nrenaredness of this or that nrotagonist to exchange recinrocal
assurances on the basis of coexistence, this should be welcome news.
The United States might fi~d the information worthy of building on,19
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The next sten American nolicy should take is to draw Jordan
into the negotiations.
been greatly debated.

Jord~~·s

refusal to enter the negotiations has

One reason for this refusal is that Jordan

believes the Camp David Accords are a sellout to Israel:
To the Saudis and other moderate Arabs (Jordan) the general
framework document that emerged from the summit delegations was at
best a repackaged version of Begin's limited autonomy plan, with no
promise of any fair expression of self-determination for the inhabi~~ts of the conquered territories.
Begin confirmed their suspicions in a speech in New York City immediately after Camp David
that seemed to rule out any meaningful exercise of self-determination
at the end of the agreed upon five-year transition period,20
Ian Lustick believes that Jordan has very good reasons for not
joining the negotiations.

He believes that

Jord~~

does not want to have

anything to do with control of the tfest Bank or "the reintroduction of
800,000 West Bank Palestinians into the Jordanian political arena".
Lustick also noints out that Jordan's domestic situation has improved
since the PLO was removed in 1970 and that King Hussein does not want
them back.

Lustick states:

In fact, it has become increasingly clear that the existence of a growing Palestinian majority on the East Bank is the
Hashemite regime's single most dangerous problem and that Israel's
continued o~fupation of the West Bank is the regime's most important asset.
By not joining the negotiations, Jordan has also not been
subjected to the same isolation from the Arab world that Egypt has.
Taking all these factors into account, Lustick feels that the prospects
for bringing Jordan into the negotiations are not good:

Althou~h 4ussei~ would be hard pressed not to accept return
of the entire '1Test Bank, including East Jerusalem, the risks of
accenting anything less are so high a com~omise ~obably will
reouire a unilateral Israeli willingness to permit the establishment of a Palestinian homeland in the occupied territories. For
Hussein would regard a Palestinian entity independent of Jordan as
a more dangerous threat to the stability of the East Bank than a
Palestinian homeland established under the auspices of, ~d closely
monitored by, the Hashemite kingdom. For the foreseeable future
the ~ice of luring Jordan into a settlement will be higher than
~~y government in Jerusalem is likely to be willing or able to
":>ay,22

Jordan's importance in the negotiations is readily apnarent.
With the exce"Ption of the Sinai, most of the terri tory Israel has
occu'!)ied since 1967 was Jordanian.

Bl Hassan Bin Talal also claims

that the Jordal"!ians and the Palestinians "are !low one people".

Any

settlement involving the Palestinians will be of great concern to
Jordan.
Sl Hassan Bin Talal gives some reasons for Jordan's concern:
(1) Half Jordan's oo-oulation is Palestinian.
(2) The West Bank and Sast Jerusalem, both captured by
Israel in 1967, were part of Jordan.
(3) If there is large-scale Palestinian migration as a
result of any regional settlement, Jordan will necessarily be
greatly affected.
(4) Virtually all Palestini~~s currently resident in
Jordan are Jordanian nationals.23

For these reasons Jordan must enter the negotiations.

This is

in direct contrast to Ian Lustick's beliefs on Jordan's willingness to
negotiate.

Talal says:

\ve have seen that Jordan is central to any Arab-Israeli
settlement, that Jordanian views must be very seriously considered
if any initiative is to have a chance at success. Yet lately we in
.Jordan have begun to hear and read that "Jorda!1 o-oooses an ArabIsraeli settlement". Let us be clear on this noint: !".O one. no
country, no -oeople wants a settlement more than we do. Certainly,
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no one ~ays a heavier urice for the continuation of the
than we do here i~ Jordan.24
The ultimate

settleme~t

to the

Palesti~ian

co~flict

Problem will have to

come in the form of either an indenendent Palestinian state in the West
3ank and Gaza or a Palestiniar-Jordanian state in the same area.
indenendent Palestinian state is the best answer.

The

Israel opposes this

solution on the grounds that it cannot give up the occunied territories
for security reasons.

The Israelis also say that an independent Pales-

tinian state bordering Israel would be a security threat.
Israel's security concerns have to be taken into account but
giving un the. West Bank and Gaza

~nd

allowing a Palestinian state to

be set un there would not be as dangerous as the Israelis believe.

In

fact, giving un the West Bank and Gaza would be beneficial to Israel.
Ian Lustick describes the nroblems caused by Israel's continued occunation of these territories:
Indeed, the greatest strai~ on Israel will be the exnenditures that will be necessary to maintain Israel's defense posture.
as long as Israeli control over the West Ba~k and Gaza continues.
Retention of these areas will ureclude achievement of a com~e
hensive neace agreement with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and
will drive Israel to maintain ~n increasingly costly military
machine.25
Lustick also nuts Israeli concern over the creation of an indenendent Palestinian state into the proner nersnective:
The Israeli concern is understandable but overstated.
Bordered by Israel with its enormous qualitative military su~ri
ority on the one side and by Jordan with its own interests and a
larger nonulation on the other, a tiny Palestinian state would not
nose an unmanageable threat to its neighbors, esnecially if it were
demilitarized or if the arms it did nossess were contracturally

6?

limited and mo~itored. Since the West Bank and Gaza are not
economically viable, a Palestinian state would also be weakened
by its de~ndence on outside economic su~port.2 6
This information leads to the conclusion that Israel wants to
hold onto this land for other than security reasons.
Menachem Begin and his

Party will not give

~erut

up

In reality
the West

Ba~~

and

Gaza, which they call Judea and Samaria, for religious and historical
reasons.

They feel that these areas are a part of the biblically

promised "Comnlete Land of Israel".
The

u.s.

must now get negotiations moving again, but using the

Camu David Framework only as a guide and not as the ultimate goal of the
negotiations.

Israel must stou its uolicy of creating new settlements.

One way to ensure that Israel
West

B~~

sto~s creatin~

new settlements in the

and Gaza is for the U.S. to begin what Lustick calls a policy

of "dissociation".
Under this policy the

u.s.

would no longer be associated with

Israeli policies that are harmful to the settlement of the Palestinian
Problem.

The

u.s.

would punish Israel by making sure that economic aid

to Israel would not be used to create new settlements or harden old ones.
At the same time the U.S. would not discontinue military aid to Israel.
This "dissociation" would be
ston

nla~s

hel~ful

because it would force Israel to

for future settlements and remove the stigma attached to the

U.S. by the Arab world for America's continued suunort of all Israel's
nolicies. 27
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Lustick's

pl~~

is good as far as it goes.

The

u.s.

should

definitely "dissociate" itself from Israel's aggressive policies.

Mon-

itoring and limiting U.S. economic aid to make sure it is not used for
building new settlements is not enough.

Instead the U.S. should hold

back a percentage of uromised economic and military aid for every new
Israeli settlement that has built
Camn David Accords.
imnroving of

u.s.

~~d

already in nlace.

should present at least a tentative

inde~endent Palestini~~

West Bank

Gaza.

the West Bank and Gaza since the

This nolicy should also extend to the hardening or

settleme~ts

Next the

i~

state in the

This

~lan

now-occu~ied

~lan

for an

territories of the

should also include a section on _the

final status of the city of Jerusalem.

The U.S. should lean toward the

internationalization of the city.
The U,S, also has to go beyond Walid Khalidi's suggestion of
letting the

Euro~eans

with the PLO directly,

contact the FLO.

The U.S. has to communicate

If the U.S. does all of these things, Jordan

would be able to enter into negotiations and conclude a neace treaty
with Israel.
After the successful

imnleme~tation

the road to a settlement of the

~alestinian

of this new American policy.
Problem would be clear.

The uroblem is that the U.S., Israel, and the other narties involved
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must realize and accent the fact that there are no easy naths to a
settlement of the uroblem. *

*If

U.S. nolicy does not achieve a settlement to the ?alesProblem soon, the Middle Sast will nrobably be thrown into
yet another war. This time active involvement by U.S. troops is
very likely. For an excellent discussion of u.s. nolicy in this
kind of conflict, see U.S, Policy and Low-Inte~sity Conflict
edited by Sam c. Sarkesian and !Jilliam L. Scully.
tini~~
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CONCLUSION

Reaching a settlement to the Palestinian Problem should be the
major concern of

u.s.

Middle Eastern policy and diplomacy.

Although

settling the Palestinian Problem would probably not totally end the
Arab-Israeli conflict, tensions in the area would be greatly reduced.

U.s. relations with the countries in the Middle East would be vastly
improved if the problem was settled.

This is especially true i f these

countries are willing to accept a positive and dynamic

u.s.

role in

reaching this settlement.
Israel would also benefit greatly from a settlement accepted
by all the pa.rties involved.

If Israel negotiated in good faith and

agreed to allow the formation of an independent Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza, all the other Arab countries would join Egypt
in recognizing the right of the state of Israel to exist. 1

This recog-

nition has been one of Israel's major concerns since 1947.

Israel's

territorial concerns, which are based on worries about security, would
become a moot issue.

Israel's present enemies would cease being hostile

once the Palestinian Problem has been settled.

Giving up the West Bank

and Gaza to the Palestinians would also remove the heavy burden of
occupation from Israel's strained

resource~.

Egypt's position in the Arab world, which has suffered greatly
since the signing of the Camp David Accords, would also vastly improve.
Egypt has been isolated from the Arab community due to the actions of
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the rejectionist front which opposes Egypt's participation in the Camp
David Accords.

Settling the Palestinian Problem would end the reason

for this isolation.

2

The non-resolution of the problem also led to the assassination
of Anwar Sadat

~~d

is one of the prime problems influencing the stability

of President Hosni Mubarak's new regime,
would better

bo~~

Mubarak's domestic and

Resolution of the problem
externa~

positions.

According

to Stanley F. Reed, the TJ. S. "has an overriding interest in Mubarak • s
survival".

Helping to achieve a settlement to the Palestinian Problem

would ensure his survival. J
The U.S. must remember two things about the Paiestinian Problem.
First, the problem must be settled very soon,

All of America's diplo-

matic resources in the Middle East must be used to reach a settlement.
Second, there is no short cut to a settlement.
have to be made and implemented,

Unpopular policies will

These policies may seem less

th~~

desirable in the short run but will turn out to be best in the long run.
President Reagan's plan for a "strategic consensus" will have
to wait.

Putting his plan aside for the moment is good for a counle of

reasons.

First, bY. putting all U.S. dinlomatic efforts into reaching

a settlement, the settlement would probably be reached.

With the end

of the Palestinian Problem would also come the major justification for
Soviet presence in the Middle 3::ast.
would, therefore, be unnecessary.

Reagan's "strategic consensus"
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Finally, increased U.S. military presence in the area w1 thout
a resolution to the nroblem would be harmful to both the U.S. and its
moderate Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia.

In his article, "Don't

Engulf the Gulf", Christo:pher Va.'"l Hollen makes this :point very clear.
In order to achieve a settlement, the
embark on the following policy.

The

u.s.

u.s.

4

should immediately

needs to convince Israel to

end its policy of creating new settlements and annexation.

Getting

Israel to give un the West Bank and Gaza so an independent Palestinian
state could be formed is also important.

The

u.s.

can make sure these

things happen by using the policy of holding back aid if new settlements
are created.
All of this also means that the Camp David Accords will no
longer be used as the ultimate goal for the settlement of the Palestinian
Problem.

u.s.

The final status of Jerusalem should also be resolved.

The

should try to convince the parties concerned that making Jerusalem

an international city is the best thing for all sides.
Eringing Jordan into the negotiations and keeping Zgy:pt in them
is also a matter of great concern for

~.S.

stop Israel's annexationist policies,

S~~t

permanent parties to the negotiations.

diplomacy,

If the U.S. can

and Jordan will both become

Egypt demands the freezing of

the establishment of new settlements and a lifting of the ban on freedom
of expression in the \.fest Bank and Gaza. 5
Jordan has virtually the same objections to Israeli policy which
keep it from joining in the negotiations.

The absence of the reryresentative
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of the Palestinian people, the PLO, also disturbs Jordan. 6 The U.s.
will also have to actively seek PLO participation in negotiations
leading to a settlement.

There can be no settlement without :participa-

tion by Jordan and the PLO.
In addition to pursuing the policies already mentioned, the

u.s.

should attempt to enlist the aid of the United Nations in its

quest for a solution to the Palestinian
could be helpful in a nUJiber of ways.

Problem~

The United Nations

First, the United Nations could

offer the use of a multinational peacekeeping force to be deployed
along the border o'f Israel and the new Palestinian state.

This peace-

keeping force should do much to allay Israeli fears concerning security.
Secondly, the UN could follow a different path and become more
vehement in its opposition to Israeli infractions of UN Resolution 242.
Every time Israel adds a new settlement or takes over more territory,
such as the Golan Heights, the UN could impose serious sanctions on
Israel.
Finally, the UN could serve as a meeting place and instigator
of talks between the
Palestinian Problem.

u.s.,

PLO, and all other parties involved in the

The fact that these talks were taking place under

the auspices of the United Nations could take away some of the perceived
stigma associated with them.
U.S. diplomats could use the UN as a counterbalance to their
reluctance to use policies that apply pressure on Israel.

The

u.s.

?6
could also volunteer sections of the
force already mentioned.

u.s.

as they are now in the Sinai.

u.s.

J.r-.y to become the peacekeeping

forees could be used in auch the sue way
This could be done if the UN does not

provide the force or as a means of getting the UN to become more aeti vely

involved.
Finally it must be noted that due to the many inherent complexities found in the Middle East, no solution to the Palestinian Problem
will be easy to reach.

Sacrifice and accollJiodation will have to be the

key actions tor all parties involved.

The problea and the tensions that

created it have existed for a long time.

None of these things can be

expected to disappear with the snap of a finger or overnight.

A solution,

however, can be reached and the U.S. JnUSt take an aeti ve role in finding
it.
The importance of an active role by the U.S. is clear for it is
obvious that the

u.s.

has a nUilber of interests in the Middle East, the

two most important being oil and keeping the Soviet Union out.
think that a

u.s.

Some may

policy that concentrates solely on the Palestinian

Problem leaves other U.S. concerns unattended.
none of the other interests of the

u.s.

This is not true for

can be enhanced or protected

until the situation in the Middle East can be brought under control.
U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East can be likened to the economy.
Quick fixes which appear helpful in the short term are really harmful
to long-term recovery.

There can be no quick fixes in U.S. Middle

Eastern policy either.

The

u.s.

must announce its goals and policies
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to settle the Palestinian Problem and stick to them.

Peace and security

for the Middle East, the United States and pos&ibly the whole world
depends on this.

•
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